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NO. 1 JANUARY 2019 Introduction 
EU and Africa: 
Investment, Trade, Development 
What a Post-Cotonou Agreement with the ACP States Can Achieve 
Evita Schmieg 
The EU is currently negotiating a successor to its Cotonou Agreement of year 2000 
with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. The political and economic con-
text has changed enormously over the past two decades, with trade relations between 
the EU and the more developed ACP countries now largely regulated by bilateral and 
regional Economic Partnership Agreements. Since 2015, in line with international 
sustainability targets, social and environmental aspects must be taken into account 
in international treaties, while in 2018 the African Union (AU) agreed to establish an 
African Continental Free Trade Area. A successor to Cotonou offers an opportunity 
to modernise the rules on issues including investment, services and migration. This 
could also generate greater interest in the talks in Germany and the EU. But the 
cooperation need to be placed on a new foundation and the African states will have 
to decide whether they want to negotiate together, as a continent. 
 
The Cotonou Agreement and its predeces-
sors, the Lomé Agreements, regulated the 
EU’s relations with its member states’ for-
mer colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific during the decades following 
their independence. A successor needs to be 
negotiated before the Cotonou Agreement 
expires in 2020. In 2017 the European Com-
mission published a proposal for future 
relations with the ACP group, which today 
comprises seventy-nine countries. It pro-
poses a framework agreement with the 
entire ACP, concluded between all parties 
to the Cotonou Agreement and defining 
shared values, goals and principles for 
future cooperation, with additional regional 
protocols for the three regions. In July 2018 
the European Council adopted a negotiat-
ing mandate confirming the Commission’s 
line. In its own negotiating mandate of May 
2018, the ACP Council of Ministers under-
lines its interest in an overall ACP agree-
ment. The negotiations began in September 
2018. 
The first, fundamental question is 
whether an agreement between the EU and 
the member states’ former colonies is still 
relevant at all, given the enormous changes 
in circumstances over the past decades. 
Europe’s political and economic signifi-
cance to Africa has declined markedly. In 
2017 it was still the most important desti-
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nation for African exports with 29 percent 
(down from about 42 percent in 2000), but 
China has made up a great deal of ground. 
Even as recently as year 2000 China played 
almost no role in the global economy, with 
just 3.6 percent of world trade. Today it is 
responsible for the largest share of new in-
vestment flowing to Africa, namely 23.9 per-
cent in 2016; the top two EU countries, 
France and the United Kingdom, account 
for almost 5 percent each, while Germany 
occupies tenth place with just under 2 per-
cent. But Europe still leads the field for in-
vestment stocks. Finally, Europe’s political 
interest in Africa has also revived. The con-
tinent is now viewed as a realm of oppor-
tunities, where a number of economies are 
developing very fast and the African middle 
class in particular is experiencing very rapid 
growth. At the same time migration from 
Africa to the EU has become an important 
issue – although migratory movements 
within Africa are actually much larger. The 
determining factors for trade and invest-
ment flows have changed too: tariffs have 
fallen globally, reducing their importance, 
allowing global value chains to arise, and 
making the economic and political frame-
work even more important for national 
competitiveness. Foreign direct investment 
is regarded as a decisive factor for securing 
growth and employment. 
Both the EU and the ACP states want co-
operation to continue. The Cotonou Agree-
ment built on three pillars: trade policy 
(with the EU granting non-reciprocal trade 
preferences), development policy (with the 
Agreement defining areas and procedures 
for the European Development Fund) and 
political dialogue. Both sides’ negotiating 
mandates foresee discussions about all 
areas of cooperation addressed in the Coto-
nou Agreement. But the priorities will have 
to shift. Europe’s biggest challenge in this 
connection will be to shape its relations 
with Africa. 
Negotiating Partners 
Below the level of the proposed framework 
agreement, it remains unclear whether the 
African Union will negotiate a regional 
protocol for Africa as a whole or the ACP 
Secretariat will seek a protocol just for the 
African ACP states. The Africa-EU Partner-
ship – based on the Joint Africa-EU Strate-
gy of 2007 – already links the European 
Union and Africa, with the latter repre-
sented by the AU. From the Union’s perspec-
tive it would make sense to merge its co-
operations with the AU and the African 
ACP states, which are also members of the 
AU. The EU’s mandate therefore proposes 
keeping talks with ACP members open to 
other states that share the basic values of 
the Cotonou Agreement. It remains unclear 
how Africa will respond to this offer. The 
AU’s role has grown enormously over the 
past two decades, driven by its interventions 
in peace and conflict resolution and its 
spring 2018 decision to create an African 
Continental Free Trade Area. So it was only 
logical for the AU’s Executive Council in 
March 2018 to claim the role of lead nego-
tiator for the African regional protocol. The 
final decision on this has not yet been made. 
The states of North Africa are not mem-
bers of the ACP group. Some of them, like 
Egypt, are sceptical towards the idea of 
joining the negotiations for a post-Cotonou 
agreement. They are already connected to 
the EU by bilateral association agreements, 
some of which are currently being renego-
tiated. So these states already possess a for-
mat within which they can assert their in-
terests vis-à-vis the EU. It is unclear whether 
it would be advantageous for them to join 
the Cotonou successor agreement. Nor can 
it be automatically assumed that the African 
ACP states would welcome a pan-African 
protocol. With the question of development 
funding representing one of their main 
interests, they might fear possible disadvan-
tages if all African states are included in the 
successor agreement. The ACP’s negotiating 
mandate says nothing about this, and the 
African states have yet to adopt a position. 
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The “Political Dimension” of 
Cooperation 
Both the ACP and the EU value the “politi-
cal dimension” as an achievement of the 
Cotonou Agreement, and wish to retain it. 
It encompasses political dialogue about 
national, regional and global questions of 
mutual interest, as well as a commitment to 
human rights, good governance, and peace 
and stability. Article 9, which names the 
“essential elements”: “human rights, demo-
cratic principles and the rule of law”, is 
regarded as especially important. The Agree-
ment created the framework and institu-
tions for political dialogue (such as the 
Council of Ministers and the Joint Parlia-
mentary Assembly) and a procedure for 
dealing with violations (Article 96). The 
latter has been used about fifteen times to 
date in response to coups, violent escala-
tions and human rights violations in ACP 
states. Sanctions under Article 96 are re-
garded as having limited effect and the 
existing EU-ACP institutions are also seen as 
rather ineffectual. Meetings of the Council 
of Ministers to date have been regarded as 
ritualised and generally not high-level. A 
need therefore exists to make the institu-
tions of the Cotonou Agreement more effi-
cient and lend them greater political weight. 
Formulations relating to human rights in 
the existing bilateral and regional economic 
partnership agreements (EPAs) between the 
EU and ACP states cross-reference the Coto-
nou Agreement, giving the EU further rea-
son to include those provisions in the new 
agreement.  
Cooperation with a large group of states 
on the basis of shared fundamental values 
can gain new significance for both sides, 
especially in times of growing foreign poli-
cy instability. This applies all the more 
when a dialogue is held not only on issues 
of bilateral concern but also as an exchange 
of views on international issues. The EU-
ACP cooperation has proven to be helpful 
and constructive, for example in the pro-
cesses leading to the adoption of inter-
national sustainability goals. The need to 
strengthen multilateral approaches, for 
example in the international trade system, 
could play a role in future. In their man-
dates the EU and ACP both underline their 
interest in a strong multilateral system. 
The EU treats migration as a high priori-
ty and would like to keep the relevant pro-
vision from the Cotonou Agreement. Arti-
cle 13 outlines basic principles for dealing 
with migration, emphasises the observance 
of human rights, and obliges states to take 
back rejected migrants. Bilateral talks on 
these issues are foreseen if necessary. Al-
though it is relatively detailed, however, 
this set of provisions has not to date played 
a role in EU-ACP relations. The ACP states 
have already indicated that they are not 
interested in including Article 13 in the 
post-Cotonou agreement. 
Development Funding 
It is currently an open question how devel-
opment finance is to be regulated. To date 
the European Development Fund (EDF) has 
depended on successively renegotiated con-
tributions from the member states under 
procedures defined in the Cotonou Agree-
ment. The Commission would like to inte-
grate the EDF, with a volume of €30.5 bil-
lion for 2014 to 2020, into the EU budget. 
This would place it under normal budget 
procedures and closer oversight by the 
European Parliament. Development finance 
would then operate in a context where all 
states followed the same rules. From the 
perspective of the Commission and some 
EU member states that would be more effi-
cient and align better with the Union’s ex-
ternal relations today. Such an orientation 
on more objective criteria would satisfy the 
aims of the Global Strategy for the Foreign 
and Security Policy (2016), which places 
development funding in the context of 
global challenges and strategic interests. 
The Global Strategy and the proposal to 
integrate the EDF into the regular budget 
reflect the fact that the new EU member 
states that joined in 2004 have no colonial 
past and therefore also no specific interest 
in special relations with former colonies in 
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the form of the ACP group. They prefer to 
orientate (development) policy more clearly 
on objective criteria and their own inter-
ests. This tendency could be strengthened 
by Brexit. 
Because the discussion about integrating 
the EDF into the EU budget is ongoing, the 
EU’s negotiating mandate for the parallel 
talks on the Cotonou successor leaves this 
question open and merely reiterates the 
existing funding principles. These include 
the target of spending 0.7 percent of GDP 
on development cooperation, with 0.2 per-
cent earmarked for the poorest countries. 
The role of bilateral and regional develop-
ment channels had already been fading, 
while the number of thematic funds has 
grown. The latter include instruments like 
the Commission’s External Investment 
Fund (EEIF) for third countries and the EU 
Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). Brexit will also 
reduce the volume of the EDF, where the 
United Kingdom has to date contributed 
14 percent. 
Trade Preferences and 
Trade Facilitation 
Non-reciprocal trade preferences granted by 
the EU represented a core element of the 
relationship with the ACP. Because they 
contravene world trade rules, the Cotonou 
Agreement proposed so-called economic 
partnership agreements (EPAs) between the 
EU and the ACP regions. The final negotia-
tions were concluded in 2014, and the 
agreement has now been implemented in 
thirteen African states as well as the EU. 
The thirty-three African countries that 
belong to the world’s poorest already enjoy 
tariff- and quota-free market access to the 
EU under the everything-but-arms initiative 
of the EU’s Generalised System of Prefer-
ences. This again secures completely free 
access to the EU for goods exports from 
almost all African states (apart from North 
and South Africa). Preferences for products 
that the EU otherwise strictly protects – 
especially (processed) agricultural products 
and textiles – are especially valuable. But 
the worth of trade preferences in general is 
declining as the EU also concludes trade 
agreements with other developing countries 
and lowers its tariffs for them too (prefer-
ence erosion). 
Against this background the most im-
portant trade-related question in the EU 
and ACP negotiating mandates is how the 
chances of ACP states to benefit from agree-
ments can be improved. Some African 
states have already benefited. For example 
South Africa recorded export increases from 
2016 to 2017 for fish (16 percent) and sugar 
(289 percent) and Madagascar from 2012 to 
2016 above all for textiles (65 percent), after 
the rules of origin were simplified under 
the EPA. Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire were able 
to increase their exports of chocolate, cocoa 
butter, cocoa paste and cocoa powder by a 
factor of 4.5 and 2.5 respectively between 
2008 and 2015. It is especially interesting 
that they succeeded in expanding local pro-
cessing and thus boosting value creation 
and employment. In other words, EPAs are 
beginning to contribute to diversification 
of exports. 
The ACP’s mandate (Art. 67) puts the 
possibility of trade preferences back on the 
table via the topic of trade facilitation. The 
ACP countries want to facilitate trade in 
services, including movement of natural 
persons. It is unclear how this could be 
concretised. There would indeed be leeway 
for a further EU market opening vis-à-vis 
sub-Saharan Africa in this area (in contrast 
to goods) because trade preferences for 
service exports are neither part of the EU’s 
Generalised System of Preferences nor has 
the issue to date been taken up in the Afri-
can EPAs. If the ACP states were to propose 
that the EU grant them non-reciprocal pre-
ferences, however, the same problem of 
conformity with WTO rules would arise as 
with trade in goods: trade preferences may 
be granted on the basis of objective criteria, 
but not restricted to a specific group of coun-
tries. Improved market access for services 
could be negotiated in the scope of free 
trade agreements. From the EU’s perspec-
tive the existing EPAs and the association 
agreements with North African states are 
 SWP Comment 1 
 January 2019 
 5 
therefore the right context for preferences 
on services. 
The WTO does permit non-reciprocal 
trade preferences for services to be granted 
to the world’s poorest states until 2030. 
Although twenty-five industrialised states 
grant preferences under this arrangement 
they are of small economic significance 
according to the UN Committee for Devel-
opment Policy, and largely restricted to the 
possibility of using services abroad. This is 
so-called Mode 2 under the General Agree-
ment on Trade in Services (GATS). But there 
are already few restrictions in this area, so 
the preferences largely reconfirm the ex-
isting level of liberalisation. GATS Mode 4, 
which provides for people to cross borders 
to provide services abroad, is much more 
interesting for developing countries. It 
would be conceivable for the ACP states to 
demand preferences for services – in par-
ticular Mode 4 – in return for concessions 
in the area of preventing migration. The 
debate over movement of people involves 
the suggestion that it will be easier to re-
strict irregular migration if channels for 
legal migration are created. 
The African Free Trade Area and 
Negotiations for a Post-Cotonou  
In their mandate the ACP states place great 
weight on further African regional integra-
tion to boost value creation and initiate 
development processes. Today finished 
products such as cement, fertiliser, cleaning 
agents and iron already play a significant 
role in trade between sub-Saharan coun-
tries, accounting for 46 percent of trade 
volume. But raw materials still dominate 
exports to countries outside Africa (with 
85 percent), while regional trade represents 
only about 20 percent of Africa’s total for-
eign trade. Only in southern and eastern 
Africa have sub-regional integration com-
munities succeeded in increasing the pro-
portion to any significant extent. In March 
2018, initially forty-four of the fifty-four 
African states decided to establish an Afri-
can Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) 
under the auspices of the AU, to accelerate 
continental integration by dismantling 
90 percent of tariffs. According to calcula-
tions by the United Nations Economic Com-
mission for Africa the abolition of all tariffs 
could increase intra-African trade by more 
than half. But the AfCFTA is not seeking 
full liberalisation. And moreover, wide-
spread enthusiasm for the initiative rather 
obscured the fact that it does no more than 
define the objectives, topics and structure 
of talks. The economically effective provi-
sions, such as how far to lower tariffs and 
which rules of origin to apply, are still to be 
negotiated. Furthermore, economic heavy-
weight Nigeria has to date refrained from 
participating; its employers and trade 
unions fear destructive competition among 
African countries. Nigerian industry also 
sees little point in ratifying a proposal whose 
substance is still completely unknown. So it 
will be a long time before the Free Trade 
Area has been finalised and implemented, 
and is thus actually able to expand trade 
flows within the region. 
In September 2018 European Commis-
sion President Jean-Claude Juncker declared 
that the EU was willing to enter into trade 
talks with Africa as a whole if the AfCFTA 
came into effect. This would only be logical 
given that the EU has for decades been en-
couraging African regional integration. The 
EPAs were originally also meant to serve 
that end. In the interests of further pan-
African integration it might be necessary to 
harmonise the different EPA tariffs of the 
countries and regions involved. It is right 
and proper that the EU declares its open-
ness to (re-)negotiate already today – even 
if a great deal of time will pass before the 
problem actually arises. 
Investment as the Crux 
In order to achieve sustainable development 
and create jobs for the African population 
– which is set to double by 2050 – private 
investment in particular must increase. The 
negotiating mandates grant corresponding-
ly broad space to this issue. The ACP states 
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“resolve to create an enabling environment 
to improve productivity and facilitate value 
creation and addition to ACP products and 
services, to foster trade competitiveness and 
encourage investment expansion”. The EU’s 
mandate provides for improvements in 
framework conditions in order to create an 
attractive and stable environment for invest-
ment. To that end the parties should estab-
lish transparent and open rules for inves-
tors, design a regulatory framework and de-
velop mechanisms to facilitate investment. 
New instruments to promote investment 
in Africa have been created in recent years. 
Under the G20 Compact with Africa (CwA) 
African states implement reforms to im-
prove the environment for investment and 
in return the G20 governments use various 
instruments to encourage private investors 
to engage more strongly in Africa. The Euro-
pean External Investment Fund provides 
€4.1 billion, designed to mobilise €44 bil-
lion in private investment by 2020. The 
Africa-Europe Alliance for Sustainable In-
vestment and Jobs unveiled by the Commis-
sion in June 2018 bundles existing initia-
tives in the area of development and trade 
of the EU-AU Partnership to strengthen 
dialogue and cooperation with Africa on 
the subject of investment climate, including 
investor protection. To this end various in-
struments are to be joined up. 
If the African states and the EU take up 
the issues of investment protection, promo-
tion and framework conditions this would 
lend great weight to the negotiations and 
the Cotonou successor agreement itself. 
ACP states and the EU could then join 
forces to create paradigmatic modern rules 
governing investment. Such agreements 
could also succeed the old bilateral invest-
ment protection agreements that were one-
sidedly tailored to investor interests and 
also contained the now discredited investor-
state dispute settlement. The latter is criti-
cised – no longer only by civil society – 
for undermining the legitimate regulatory 
interests of states – for example on con-
sumer protection – and permitting com-
panies to sue governments outside their 
country’s system. The European Union is 
therefore working in the international arena 
towards a transparent, multilateral replace-
ment with an appeals system. 
A modern investment agreement between 
the EU and Africa – or the ACP group – 
should guarantee investors security and sta-
bility for their investments, but also commit 
them to social and ecological goals in line 
with the international sustainability goals. 
With its Investment Policy Framework for 
Sustainable Development, the UN Confer-
ence on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
has presented guidelines and options for 
modern investment agreements designed to 
fulfil precisely that objective. Apart from 
that comprehensive compendium, the EU’s 
Economic Partnership Agreement with fif-
teen Caribbean states contains a number of 
formulations committing investors to social 
and ecological standards. Further orienta-
tion is supplied by the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises on corporate 
social responsibility. The parties could agree 
to establish national contact points, analo-
gous to those for the OECD Guidelines, that 
also grant representatives of civil society 
the right to lodge complaints.  
All discussions about promoting invest-
ment must include the aspect of strengthen-
ing local and regional investment, and not 
just foreign direct investment. 
Outlook 
The Cotonou Agreement was the last agree-
ment that still breathed the spirit of the 
post-colonial ties of the EU and its member 
states. Its successor will be more strongly 
determined by political interests. In their 
mandate the ACP states particularly empha-
sise issues like regional integration, invest-
ment to increase value creation, trade in 
services and the framework for sustainable 
development of African states. They under-
line their interest in joining with the EU to 
create modern arrangements for coopera-
tion in new fields and growth areas. The EU 
should grasp this opportunity to strengthen 
its position in Africa. As a continent with 
strong growth in many regions and a rapid-
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ly growing population (and middle class), 
Africa is set to play a larger economic and 
political role in the world. Additionally 
Europe has a pressing interest in securing 
development and security in the continent 
to its south. 
Investment has become a key question 
for Africa’s future development and will be 
an issue in the negotiations on a successor 
to Cotonou. In view of the multitude of 
existing instruments, negotiations about an 
investment regime that combines investor 
protection with sustainability commitments 
promise especially great added value. The 
time until 2020 may be too short to achieve 
far-reaching progress in this direction. But 
it would be a good first step if the Cotonou 
successor agreement were able to set some 
important markers on the road to a com-
prehensive investment agreement. That 
would mean formalising the intention to 
conclude such an agreement and laying 
down the first ground rules. 
In the area of trade the uppermost ques-
tion will be what instruments are suited to 
further expand the benefit of existing trade 
rules for the ACP states. Successful exam-
ples where African exports and value crea-
tion have been increased are encouraging, 
but not yet enough for a great success of 
the EPAs. It would make sense to integrate 
the topics of investment and trade promo-
tion. Finally, EPAs have created especially 
strong trade preferences in areas that are 
attractive to less developed countries. Gen-
erally, broad export successes are found 
primarily where trade liberalisation has 
been accompanied by internal reforms. 
Linkage of reform and investment is also 
a line pursued by the G20 Compact with 
Africa. An associated specific EU Compact 
with EPA Countries could take up the task 
of promoting new investments in connec-
tion with the EPA. 
Certainly the discussion about trade and 
investment has taken a constructive turn. 
The debate about the point and dangers of 
EPAs – about which there were hefty con-
troversies between Africa and the EU and 
within the member states – may be a thing 
of the past. Certainly the negotiating man-
date of the ACP states no longer calls EPAs 
into question, but instead seeks successful 
implementation. 
The ACP states may conceivably demand 
trade preferences for Mode 4 services in the 
European market, possibly as quid quo pro 
for EU demands in the sphere of migration. 
Here the EU appears as “demandeur” seek-
ing promises from the ACP states to take 
back rejected migrants. In the negotiations 
it will have to offer something in return, 
especially if the question of development 
funding – which is important to the ACP 
countries – is settled outside the negotia-
tions. From the perspective of the ACP, it 
would be a consistent negotiating strategy 
to tie migration issues to trade preferences 
for services, especially Mode 4. 
The negotiations about a Cotonou suc-
cessor agreement certainly offer the EU an 
opportunity to discuss with a large group of 
states about value-based political and eco-
nomic cooperation. Given the number of 
communication channels that have broken 
down over recent years, the Union should 
grasp this opportunity. 
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